Perhaps the problem is less that his "spidey sense" is off, and more that judging everything based on an imagined "spidey sense" is not just unreliable but moreover a recipe for constantly getting conned and befuddled. (I enjoy this remark, as I said years ago that Harris' approach to every problem is to defer to his intuitions. His critique of compatibilism in the Dennett conversations explicitly boiled down to this: in so many words he claimed to have the intuition that compatibilism was wrong, and to regard this intuition as both sufficient proof in itself and as incorrigible to any and all considerations. Of course, his defense of both moral realism in general and some kind of utilitarianism in particular come down -- similarly explicitly -- to his intuition that they are correct. So it's enjoyable watching his explicit accounting of his judgment of people and movements take exactly the same course.)