For example, one of the first vulnerabilities I found, that was used for the introduction hook in the 39c3 talk, remains unpatched to this day. Instead of being fixed with code, Werner Koch - the main developer of GnuPG - published a blog post declaring the widely-used feature being “harmful”; while they had weeks in advance, they published this on day one of 39c3, not even giving us time to respond.
what the actual fuck
Somewhat reminded of @jonah@neat.computer’s general recommendation against GPG (for other reasons than what this talk is about)
Is there another thing to use? At least for the flow(s) of “encrypt, transfer, decrypt” or “sign, transfer, verify” for binary files. BSD licensed, preferably.
EDIT: minisign was mentioned on the talk… not in the most positive way but would still trust (after they get their shit together of course); however would never trust “age” with what they did
however would never trust “age” with what they did
What happened with
age(or its devs?) that made you not trust it?(I actually managed to watch basically the same talk at a different event on the site pgp.fail, whoops)
For me, I feel like the mistake mentioned was the most dead obvious one. Prefixing a plugin name from the file with a path then literally running the executable named. At the end of the talk, an
agedev bought the researchers with stickers on camera.
Yeah, GPG is a dumpster fire. It’s security theatre at its finest.
Bruce Schneier, who invented the term security theater, would perhaps disagree with you.
